Coming into the Anthropocene by Purdy, Jedediah
  
1619 
BOOK REVIEW 
COMING INTO THE ANTHROPOCENE 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
AND THE SUPREME COURT.  By Jonathan Z. Cannon.  Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press.  2015.  Pp. 374.  $45.00. 
Reviewed by Jedediah Purdy∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Law is the boring side of many interesting topics.  Entertainment 
law is not famously amusing, nor is the law of war notably heroic or 
monstrous.  Law is the place where passion comes to die of procedure. 
Nonetheless, there is something especially poignant in this vignette 
from the early weeks of any introductory course on environmental law.  
Students arrive, animated by a memory of Yosemite Valley or a 
kayaking trip, a passion for biology or rock climbing, a love of oceans 
or animals.  They find seats, deposit their water bottles, and open their 
laptops.  Then they are introduced to the Clean Air Act1 and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act2 (NEPA), the category of Best Avail-
able Technology, and the Finding of No Significant Impact. 
Aesthetic judgments are notoriously hard to defend, but it does not 
seem controversial that environmental law is among the driest, most 
technical, and least thematically coherent fields around.  If environ-
mental law has a superstatute,3 it is the procedural NEPA, which does 
not engage the substantive values at stake in the natural world.  Little 
in the way of rich or imaginative doctrine has developed: the field re-
mains defined by court review of agency interpretation of statutes — 
making it, in effect, a subfield of administrative law, only with rivers 
and trees in the cases.  Although much of the scholarship in environ-
mental law has tried to find a master vocabulary in cost-benefit analy-
sis, the law itself has an inconsistent, even erratic relation to economic 
balancing. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Robinson O. Everett Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  Thanks to David 
Grewal for perceptive comments on an early draft, and to the Harvard Law Review. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 2 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 
(2012)). 
 3 See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216, 1230–
31 (2001) (describing superstatutes as laws that substantially alter the regulatory baseline with a 
new policy or principle, stick in the public culture, and have a broad effect on the law). 
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Not to put too fine a point on it, environmental law is often boring.  
Yet it is among the fields that people come to, and stay in, out of love.  
It is one area where procedure has not killed off passion.  This is true 
despite the fact that the nature-loving students who fill environmental 
law classes find little in the statutes and doctrines to match the zeal of 
their commitments. 
Professor Jonathan Z. Cannon knows both sides of this paradox 
with a rare intimacy.  He was general counsel of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) from 1995 until 1998, following a nearly 
twenty-year career practicing environmental law in both the govern-
ment and private sector.4  He is currently the Blaine T. Phillips Distin-
guished Professor of Environmental Law at the University of Virginia 
Law School, where, along with “hard” environmental law, he teaches a 
seminar, cross-listed with the English department, on the literature of 
environmentalism.5  He has spoken on public occasions about the 
adult lawyer’s version of the beginning student’s discomfiture: rooms 
full of high-powered advocates, expertly deploying technical vocabu-
lary, none of them naming the underlying question that fuels their con-
flict — whether a tract of forest should be logged, a coal-fired turbine 
installed, or a piece of habitat paved for a highway.6  The conflicting 
commitments that bring parties and lawyers to the bar are often so 
concealed in technical forms that they are irrecoverably invisible. 
Cannon’s debut book, Environment in the Balance, sets itself an 
ambitious task: to overcome this division by showing that environmen-
tal law, much as it may appear dry and dull, is deeply infused with 
conflicts over values.  Cannon’s project is to reveal the green ghost in 
the gray machine, the soul of disagreement that lends shape to argu-
ments that may otherwise seem aridly technical.  He does this by care-
fully reading thirty major Supreme Court decisions in environmental 
law and teasing out the differences in worldview that animate the  
Justices’ reasoning — divisions that are not simply over abstract legal 
questions, but rather reflect divergent views of the natural world and 
the human place in it. 
This Review places Cannon’s arguments at the cusp of a new era in 
environmental law, politics, and culture that is also a new era of plane-
tary history: the Anthropocene, or “age of humanity.”  In the 
Anthropocene, people have become a force, arguably the force, in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See Jonathan Z. Cannon, U. VA. SCH. L., http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/Faculty.nsf 
/PrFHPbW/jzc8j?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=2#_Section2 [http://perma.cc/JZC5-GZH3]. 
 5 See id. 
 6 E.g., Jonathan Cannon, Religious Roots, New Futures? — The Promise and Peril of Faith in 
Environmental Law (Apr. 13, 2013), in 18th Annual Symposium: Religion, Faith and the Envi-
ronment, U. UTAH S.J. QUINNEY C.L., http://www.law.utah.edu/event/12233 [http://perma 
.cc/YPV9-5MYE]. 
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development of the planet.  From atmospheric chemistry and global 
weather patterns to biodiversity, the world we inhabit is increasingly 
the world we are creating.  This suite of changes has great meaning for 
understanding environmental law. 
Parts I and II of this Review present a faithful and admiring ac-
count of Cannon’s major arguments.  They trace the struggle between 
environmentalist and anti-environmentalist worldviews in key inter-
pretive contests: over the scope of Article III standing; the place of 
private property in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause; the prohi-
bition on “taking” a member of an endangered species in the Endan-
gered Species Act7 (ESA); and the procedural and/or substantive char-
acter of NEPA.  Section III.A then assesses Cannon’s weighing of the 
prospects for synthesis among competing environmental worldviews, 
notably in market-oriented environmentalism and the enthusiasm for 
technology among, for instance, advocates of geoengineering as a re-
sponse to climate change.  Section III.B locates Cannon’s topic within 
the last forty-five years of environmental law’s history.  The environ-
mental worldviews of judges are particularly interesting now because 
environmental legislation has stalled, making interpretation by courts 
and agencies especially salient.  Therefore, how these interpreters rea-
son, and how their reasoning is influenced by the environmental 
worldviews that Cannon traces, contributes significantly to the devel-
opment of environmental law in practice. 
In section III.C, I introduce the concept of the Anthropocene and 
argue that both types of worldview that Cannon traces, the environ-
mental and ecological and the anti-environmental and pre-ecological, 
are products of pre-Anthropocene understandings of environmental 
problems.  They presuppose a relatively stable meaning of “nature,” 
both empirically — what nature is and how it works — and norma-
tively — what the value of nature is and how human values fit within 
it.  Both the empirical and the normative baselines are irrecoverably 
gone in the Anthropocene.  In the future, both the material character-
istics of the world and the values embodied in it will be, in important 
ways, products of human activity and decision. 
In Part IV, I argue that the human decisions that shape the 
Anthropocene should be political and democratic.  In section IV.A, I 
consider the alternatives — market-modeled economic rationality and 
administrative technocracy — and argue that neither is conceptually 
adequate to solve a problem that involves not just clarifying and ag-
gregating values, but also choosing those values in the project of 
choosing what sort of world to inhabit.  The source of these choices is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 
16 U.S.C.). 
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not expertise, but the larger ferment of cultural argument, which only 
politics can make the basis of collective choice; only democratic poli-
tics, in turn, can do so legitimately.  If Anthropocene choices are not 
taken democratically, they will amount to the imposition, willy-nilly, of 
the preferred futures of some on the lives of others. 
In section IV.B, I reflect on the difficulty of making good on what I 
have argued, particularly in light of the gap between the scope and ca-
pacity of existing democratic orders and the scale and intensity of in-
terlinked economic and ecological changes.  I argue that a choice of 
environmental futures is inseparable from a choice of economic fu-
tures: because economic life is the center of humans’ collective shaping 
of the planet, there is, in a real sense, no question of economic policy 
that is not also an environmental question, and no environmental 
question that can be resolved without corresponding economic judg-
ments.  Concurrently, those who recognize this expansion of the mean-
ing of environmental problems must keep in view how very far the 
ideal of democratic decisionmaking about these linked environmental–
economic questions is from the present reality of nominally democratic 
governments: inefficacy, inadequate scope, the oligarchy-making role 
of money, and persistent failures of collective self-restraint.  For the 
reasons developed above, an environmental politics adequate to the 
Anthropocene question can arise only alongside an enhanced and ex-
panded democracy. 
I.  ENVIRONMENTALISM’S INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION 
Cannon’s story begins with a reminder: environmental law may 
seem a merely technical field now, but it was not always so.  Four-plus 
decades ago, the birth of modern environmental law came at a time of 
tremendous cultural ferment.  From Sierra Club activists to influential 
commentators to congresspersons explaining the wave of environmen-
tal legislation that emerged in the 1970s, many argued that ecological 
insight demanded changes in values and consciousness.  Ecology, ex-
plained the Sierra Club Bulletin, had been a science; now it needed to 
become something more like a religion.8  Pundits and legislators agreed.9 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Elizabeth Rogers, Protest!, SIERRA CLUB BULL. (Sierra Club, San Francisco, Cal.), Dec. 
1969, at 10, 20 (quoting Kerry Thornley, Digging Wholes, WORKSHOP IN NONVIOLENCE (WIN) 
(War Resisters League, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1969, at 21); see also Connie Flatboe, Environmen-
tal Teach-In, SIERRA CLUB BULL. (Sierra Club, San Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 1970, at 14, 15 (call-
ing for a “cultural transformation” marked by “personal commitment to a new philosophy and 
poetry of ecology” (quoting Jerry Yudelson of the California Institute of Technology Environmen-
tal Action Council)). 
 9 See Flora Lewis, Instant Mass-Movement, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1970, at B7 (“The ideas [of 
ecology] are so fundamentally new, so drastically opposed to the heritage of many centuries, they 
are painful to absorb. . . . Environmental harmony requires a much deeper review of western 
thought, now challenged on almost every level.”); see also 117 CONG. REC. 38,819 (1971) (state-
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Drawing on several decades of social science research, Cannon ar-
gues that this activism was not empty talk.  Rather, a genuine shift in 
consciousness occurred in the environmental politics of the 1960s and 
1970s (p. 5).  This shift brought to prominence a “new environmental 
paradigm” (p. 6),10 an outlook including the beliefs that (1) “nature is a 
limited resource on which humans depend” for health and survival (p. 
6); (2) human-natural systems are interdependent and complex, charac-
terized by delicate balances that are vulnerable to disruption; and (3) 
nature’s value is not simply in its usefulness to human beings: it 
should also be valued for its own sake (p. 6).  Taken together, these 
ideas implied — at least to many environmentalists — that human be-
ings should work to achieve, sustain, and participate in a harmonious 
relationship with fragile, finite natural systems (pp. 13–23).11  Many 
environmentalists also concluded that, in light of the vulnerability of 
natural systems, the intensity of human dependence on them, and the 
intrinsic value of nature, environmental concerns should enjoy priori-
ty: nature should come first, at least sometimes (p. 23). 
In Cannon’s telling, only some Americans adopted the new envi-
ronmental paradigm.  Others remained attached to the “dominant so-
cial paradigm,” an outlook regarding nature as (1) abundant; (2) ro-
bust; and (3) valuable chiefly for its usefulness to human beings (pp.  
6–7).12  These optimistic and human-centered premises about nature 
tended to support a program of market-led extraction and use of natu-
ral resources: in short, a laissez-faire, development-oriented agenda (p. 
7).  By contrast, the new environmental paradigm tended to support 
extensive regulatory intervention to protect finite and delicate natural 
systems from human damage, both for their own sake and to prevent 
blowback harm to human health (pp. 19–25).  Cannon follows Profes-
sor Dan Kahan and his collaborators in arguing that the disagreements 
between the two worldviews over environmental questions tracks 
more general disagreements about government regulation and the role 
of the state in economic life (pp. 7–9).  Kahan and his colleagues have 
found that variance over a wide range of issues, from abortion and 
guns to nuclear power and climate change, corresponds robustly to in-
dividuals’ locations on a four-part worldview grid whose two axes run 
between the poles of hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and individual-
ism versus collectivism (pp. 7–9).  Because the new environmental 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ment of Sen. John Sherman Cooper) (arguing that the Clean Water Act “asserts the primacy of the 
natural order on which all, including man, depends”). 
 10 The author quotes Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. Van Liere, The “New Environmental Para-
digm”: A Proposed Measuring Instrument and Preliminary Results, 9 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 19 (1978). 
 11 The author explores the relation among these values and their implications. 
 12 The author cites Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. Van Liere, Commitment to the Dominant So-
cial Paradigm and Concern for Environmental Quality, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 1013 (1984). 
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paradigm — let’s call it the “ecological outlook,” to avoid the neolo-
gism! — supports a strong role for government and promotes regula-
tion of businesses, ranchers, and farmers, it attracts collectivists and 
alienates individualists (pp. 8–9). 
Perhaps because of its mistrust of traditional figures of authority 
such as business leaders, its embrace of community-led activism, and 
its concern for the victims of environmental harm, the ecological out-
look also has affinities with egalitarian rather than hierarchical  
outlooks (pp. 8–9).  Moreover, the ecological outlook contradicts a key 
traditional hierarchy, the presumed superiority of human beings over 
the natural world, and proposes to replace it with biological egalitari-
anism, the recognition that all living things matter (pp. 13–15).  Be-
cause differences in worldview affect not just “normative” questions 
(“How important is nature relative to human interests?”) but also how 
people process “empirical” information (“How fragile is nature?  How 
much harm are people doing, and what dangers are they creating?”), 
the ecological outlook tends to perpetuate and even amplify its own 
characteristics (p. 9). 
Environmental law, then, arose as part of an incomplete revolution.  
During the 1970s, modern environmental law took form as the United 
States adopted a wave of major statutes, most of them by overwhelm-
ing congressional majorities.  These statutes included NEPA, the 
Clean Water Act,13 the Clean Air Act, and the ESA, as well as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act14 (CERCLA, or the “Superfund Act”).  By the late 1970s, sociolo-
gists were beginning to document the emergence of a pro-environment 
consensus in American society (pp. 6–7).15  But that growth of concern 
soon stalled (p. 5).  Indeed, the pre-ecological16 outlook of the 1970s 
could not overcome the dominant social paradigm (p. 7).  Absorbed in-
to longer-running American divisions between hierarchy and equality, 
and individualism and community, environmentalism became a flash 
point of disagreement.17  As Cannon summarizes his interpretation of 
the last forty-five years: “We face a paradox . . . .  Despite its appar-
ently successful inroads into the culture, environmentalism is perceived 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). 
 14 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 15 The author cites Dunlap & Van Liere, supra note 10, at 19. 
 16 I use the term “pre-ecological” both to avoid neologism and because whether it remains 
dominant is unclear. 
 17 See Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 215–18 (2012) [hereinafter Purdy, American Natures]; see also 
Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Laws, 
62 DUKE L.J. 857, 880–81 (2013) [hereinafter Purdy, Our Place in the World]. 
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widely as having failed in its basic transformative mission and lacking 
the strength to force further change” (p. 26).  In other words, environ-
mentalism has reached an impasse. 
II.  CULTURAL DIVISION AS A KEY TO LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
Cannon’s cultural interpretation of environmentalism is the key-
stone of a bridge connecting widespread but amorphous political con-
flict to specific Supreme Court decisions.  Certain important areas of 
doctrine pivot on the worldviews of the Justices (p. 49).  Such areas 
concern watershed questions about the role and structure of law: the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts and Congress; the existence or nonex-
istence of substantive priority for environmental protection or, alterna-
tively, of substantive priority for private property rights; and the status 
of cost-benefit analysis in the design of regulation.  In certain cases in-
volving standing, the Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause, and a va-
riety of statutory interpretation questions, the Court of course looks to 
traditional legal materials, as it does elsewhere; but what it makes of 
those materials depends in part on where the Justices stand with re-
spect to the basic division between the post-1970 ecological worldview 
and the human-centered, development-oriented outlook that competes 
with it. 
Certain constitutional questions especially lend themselves to this 
type of analysis because their core concepts were formed in eras when 
the law’s commitment to the traditional paradigm was much stronger.  
Their contours express the shape of a pre-ecological worldview.  The 
Court’s choice in these cases, therefore, comes down to whether it will 
change inherited concepts by incorporating elements of the ecological 
outlook, or whether it will cabin the reach of the ecological outlook by 
fencing environmental claims within pre-ecological legal constraints.  
Legal interpretation in these cases is also a face-off between ecological 
and pre-ecological versions of ideas such as causation and harm, the 
public interest, and the meaning of private property in land. 
A.  Ecological Standing 
Take standing18: a party’s qualification to bring a claim in federal 
court depends on the familiar formula that she must have (1) suffered 
an injury that (2) is caused by a breach of another party’s legal duty 
and (3) is likely to be remedied by the action the plaintiff requests of 
the court.19  This formula necessarily turns on views about what 
counts as injury, causation, and remediation.  Traditionally, the term 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Cannon devotes an entire chapter to standing (pp. 141–70), in which he pays particular at-
tention to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (pp. 164–69). 
 19 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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“injury” means harms to a bodily or economic interest, particularly 
that of a property holder.20  Standing’s paradigmatic legal subject, 
therefore, is the autonomous individual, standing apart from nature 
and in control of it.  A legally cognizable injury would be, so to speak, 
a direct hit on the body or property of that individual. 
This concept may seem rather abstract, but its importance comes 
into focus once one appreciates how sharply certain ecological premis-
es call these assumptions into question, in practical ways that federal 
courts cannot avoid addressing.  The modern environmental move-
ment portrays people as having salient, nonownership interests in both 
nature itself and the defense of intrinsically valuable natural entities 
like rivers and endangered species.  Citizen-suit provisions authorize 
plaintiffs to enforce these interests by, for example, seeking review of 
administrative actions, or vindicating antipollution or species-
protecting statutes.21  Permitting these cases to go forward accepts that 
the new environmental paradigm has changed the set of legally cog-
nizable interests that federal courts may enforce; blocking them on 
standing grounds marks a constitutional boundary on the ecological 
expansion of the law’s conception of injury. 
If new environmental values force judgments about the meaning of 
“injury” in standing jurisprudence, the ecological premise of interde-
pendence invites new questions about what it means to cause an inju-
ry, and what counts as a remedy.  The defining problem of modern en-
vironmental law is the management of subtle, complex, long-distance 
forms of interdependence, in which an event may have effects much 
later, far away, and in an unexpected fashion: air pollution, for in-
stance, showing up as lake acidification or higher heavy-metal levels in 
soil many miles downwind.  Such problems do not present what the 
traditional law of standing would have regarded as direct hits to per-
son or property.  Many other contributing and mitigating factors con-
found the effects: What other sources of pollution are involved?  What 
is the baseline level of contamination?  How far is too far downwind?  
What level of dilution removes water pollution from the polluter’s  
responsibility? 
As Justice Scalia emphasized shortly before joining the Court, envi-
ronmental plaintiffs ask the government to regulate a third party — 
usually a landowner or industry claimed to be in violation of an  
environmental statute.22  In this regard, standing cases crystallize the  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing types of legal injury, 
including many involving bodily or economic harm). 
 21 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63 (“[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for 
purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”). 
 22 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882–85 (1983).  Justice Scalia also pointed out that the  
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dispute that Cannon and others see as central to political disputes over 
environmentalism: whether and in what respects government may ap-
propriately regulate the market economy. 
The issue of interdependence was at the heart of Chief Justice  
Roberts’s dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA.23  Writing for four Justices, 
the Chief Justice argued in effect that climate change so thoroughly 
fails to fit the contours of traditional standing that no plaintiff can 
come into federal court to ask that it be regulated.24  The lines of in-
terdependence are too long, complex, and globally dispersed across ju-
risdictions, and the relative contributions of human action and baseline 
natural perturbations too obscure, for a court to say that any one inju-
ry was caused by any specific breach of legal duty and would likely be 
remedied by addressing that breach.  In a sense, this idea is uncontro-
versial, and precisely the point of environmentalists’ insistence on in-
terdependence: nothing can be understood in isolation from everything 
else.  The question is what these facts about the natural world imply 
for humans’ legal responsibilities.  There was irony in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion: it implied that intensified interdependence dimin-
ished responsibility so much that the federal courts had to wash their 
hands of climate change. 
By contrast, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court accepted that 
causal relationships that would once have seemed too attenuated to 
support standing can justify Article III jurisdiction today, in light of 
new insight into ecological relations and the urgency of addressing 
climate change (a powerful supporting consideration).25  Taking these 
touchstones of the ecological outlook as implicit sources of legal inter-
pretation produced an expansive view of standing, while confining 
standing to pre-ecological concepts would have blocked climate change 
plaintiffs from the federal courts.  So constitutional interpretation can 
also be a contest between differing views of the natural world. 
B.  Private Property in the Age of Interdependence 
In some instances, the Justices’ environmental attitudes inflect both 
their constitutional and their statutory interpretations.  Cases dealing 
with private property are exemplary.26  William Blackstone’s famous 
description of the “sole and despotic dominion” that ownership estab-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
traditional judicial responsibility is to protect the rights of individuals against the majority.  See 
id. at 894; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62. 
 23 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24 See id. at 535–49. 
 25 See id. at 516–26 (majority opinion). 
 26 Cannon discusses private property (pp. 200–30), focusing on Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), (pp. 206–16); and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), (pp. 218–22), concluding with an interpretive 
summary (pp. 226–30). 
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lishes over a piece of land27 has been much belittled and qualified, but 
it remains a touchstone expression of what one might call the classical 
version of property.28  Ownership, in the classical version, implied 
primary and nearly exhaustive authority to set the agenda of use for a 
piece of land: whether agriculture, industry, residence, or preservation, 
the decision lay with the owner.  The common law’s restrictions on 
owners’ authority served mainly to protect the reciprocal interests of 
immediately neighboring landowners, as nuisance doctrine did, or to 
secure the interests of future owners who already enjoyed legally de-
fined reversionary or remainder interests, as in the law of waste.  
Owners, that is, owed some forbearance to other owners who neigh-
bored them in space or time; but otherwise, the use of land was up to 
the current owners. 
Ecological interconnection implies a much wider set of interests at 
stake in private land use.  Numerous and remote others, many (if not 
most) of whom are not the owners of private lands, may depend on the 
water purification that wetlands accomplish, the carbon uptake of for-
ests, or the storm-buffering effect of a barrier beach.  And these exam-
ples are merely at the level of the individual landowner: much broader 
effects come into play when one considers air and water emissions 
from factories, power plants, and so forth.  For law to vindicate the in-
terests that these ecological effects touch, it is not enough for courts to 
balance the competing common law claims of owners and potential 
owners.  Instead, legislatures must impose collective judgments about 
which interests deserve protection, and in what measure.  Thus, pri-
vate property moves from being an emblem of practical self-sufficiency 
and a touchstone of legal autonomy to being thoroughly entangled in 
interdependence and subject to collective regulatory judgments.  This 
change is both a major shift in the legal landscape and a significant 
symbolic affront to a traditional image of self-reliance. 
Moreover, the environmentalist idea that the nonhuman realm of 
the natural world matters for its own sake greatly expands the set of 
values that might limit the powers of owners.  Never mind neighbors: 
what about all the plant and animal species that share a plot of land, 
and for which that land is a habitat rather than an economic resource?  
Once the ESA created express federal protection for what Cannon 
calls “the environmental other” (p. 80), sole and despotic dominion was 
no longer on the menu. 
 
1.  Taking Interdependent Property. — Exactly what ownership 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 28 See generally Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE 
L.J. 601 (1998). 
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meant after ecology’s incomplete revolution became a constitutional 
flashpoint in the doctrine of takings, the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “private property” shall not be 
“taken” without “just compensation.”29  The question in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council30 was whether beachfront property 
had been “taken” within the meaning of the amendment, and its owner 
thus entitled to compensation, when South Carolina prohibited all 
construction on a certain class of barrier-island land that included 
Lucas’s plot.  The reason for the building ban was to limit erosion and 
storm damage by preserving the buffering function of the barrier 
beaches.31  Lucas’s intended use of the property, building single-family 
homes,32 was precisely what property law had traditionally aimed to 
protect and encourage, and now suddenly prohibited instead. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that a regulation that 
eliminated all economically valuable use of a piece of land (as the trial 
court found was the case for Lucas’s property33) is a taking per se.34  
The effect was to impose a constitutional boundary on legislatures’ 
power to redefine the rights of ownership in light of ecological interde-
pendence.  Justice Scalia wrote that a legislature could eliminate all 
economically valuable use of a piece of land and avoid the compensa-
tion requirement only if the banned use could also have been prohibit-
ed under “background principles of [a] [s]tate’s law of property and 
nuisance already in place”35 when the owner obtained the property.36  
In dissent, Justice Stevens objected that environmental law should be 
understood as expressing the ongoing moral learning of society, much 
as evolving common law principles had once done, and thus as chang-
ing the scope of ownership in balance with ecological concerns.37  By 
contrast, Justice Scalia invoked a “historical compact” memorialized in 
the Takings Clause, which guaranteed traditional ownership against 
excessively intrusive redefinition.38 
Lucas thus reflects the view that private property retains a  
pre-ecological core that the Constitution shields from interference.  To 
constitutionalize this idea ties a key aspect of the legal relationship be-
tween people and the natural world — that of ownership — to its 
pre-ecological origins in a world where the autonomy of owners 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 30 505 U.S. 1003. 
 31 See id. at 1008–09, 1008 n.1. 
 32 Id. at 1008. 
 33 Id. at 1009. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Id. at 1029. 
 36 See id. at 1027–30. 
 37 See id. at 1069–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38 See id. at 1028 (majority opinion). 
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seemed intuitive in a way that ecological interdependence confounds. 
2.  Statutory Interpretation and Ecological Ownership. — In 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,39 
the Court again asked how far environmental lawmaking could revise 
traditional ownership.40  Here the issue lay in interpretation of the 
ESA, which forbids anyone, including private parties, to “take” a 
member of an endangered species.41  The statute defined “take” to 
include “harm[ing]” a member of the species;42 and the Department of 
the Interior, in turn, defined “harm” to include “significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife 
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering.”43  The question in Sweet Home was 
whether the statute’s language supported the regulatory definition of 
“harm” as including habitat modification.44 
The Court upheld the relatively expansive agency definition of 
“harm” over a strong dissent from Justice Scalia.45  For Justice Scalia, 
the heart of the matter was the traditional sense of the term “take,” 
which connoted using direct force against, or seizing control of, an in-
dividual animal.46  From this conservative, textualist position, no 
amount of ecological interconnection could expand that older sense of 
the word to include effects on an animal that were mediated through 
effects on its habitat: cutting trees in ways that impeded breeding or 
nesting was not at all the same thing as “taking” an animal.  By con-
trast, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, hung its decision on 
the term “harm” in the statutory definition of “take,” arguing that 
harm may be indirect as well as direct, and that treating habitat deg-
radation as a form of indirect harm advanced one of the ESA’s core 
purposes — the preservation of ecosystems on which endangered spe-
cies rely.47 
Like the conservative view in the standing cases, Justice Scalia’s 
position in Sweet Home would have tethered a tract of law to a pre-
ecological idea of causation.  The dissent would have restricted the 
prohibition of land-use decisions to acts of individual-to-individual vi-
olence, such as hunting or trapping a member of a protected species.  
A pre-ecological interpretation of a key operative term would have 
significantly weakened the statute’s prohibition of harms arising from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 40 Id. 
 41 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 42 Id. § 1532(19). 
 43 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013). 
 44 See 515 U.S. at 690. 
 45 Id. at 708. 
 46 See id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 697–702 (majority opinion). 
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ecological interdependence. 
Moreover, like his interpretation of the Takings Clause in Lucas, 
Justice Scalia’s Sweet Home dissent would have shielded traditional 
economic expectations against collective, political revision launched in 
the name of ecological protection.  Justice Scalia interpreted the ESA 
as envisioning the protection of privately owned habitats mainly 
through federal purchase — that is, the government could protect hab-
itat not by revising the rights of owners, but by acquiring their owner-
ship rights on the market.48  This approach would secure private own-
ership against undermining by ecological interdependence: precisely as 
with takings, a government that wanted to change landowners’ powers 
would have to purchase the rights to the land.  The turn to collective 
regulation that ecological interdependence implied could take place on-
ly with a price tag dictated by pre-ecological ownership. 
C.  NEPA as an Emblem of an Incomplete Revolution 
One statute’s interpretation serves as a kind of synecdoche for the 
last four decades of environmental law.  NEPA, which became law in 
1970, contains a series of substantive directives for all federal policy: 
among others, to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as  
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations”; “assure for all 
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings”; “attain the widest range of beneficial uses of 
the environment without degradation”; and “maintain, wherever pos-
sible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individ-
ual choice.”49  Cannon calls the statute’s substantive language “a suc-
cinct, compelling articulation of the NEP [new environmental 
paradigm]” (p. 235).  As he points out, Professor Lynton Caldwell, the 
chief intellectual architect of NEPA, regarded it as a statement of a 
new public policy based on principles of interdependence and coopera-
tion (p. 236).50  Some federal courts seemed poised to move in the same 
direction, indicating new sympathy for ecological values.  As Judge 
Wright wrote in the landmark Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, 
Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,51 the courts should 
expect “a flood of . . . litigation seeking judicial assistance in protect-
ing our natural environment . . . to control, at long last, the destructive 
engine of material ‘progress.’”52  The judicial mood that Judge Wright 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 See id. at 727–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012). 
 50 See also LYNTON K. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR MODERN SO-
CIETY 237–39 (1970) (calling for more integration of an “ecological” way of thinking into an “eco-
nomic” mode that “ma[d]e nature serve man’s material needs,” id. at 237). 
 51 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 52 Id. at 1111. 
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expressed also appeared in dissents by Justices Douglas and Blackmun 
in the seminal environmental-standing case Sierra Club v. Morton,53 in 
which the two Justices assumed, respectively, that environmentalists 
were self-evidently the trustees and spokespersons of the natural 
world,54 and that well-established environmental groups spoke for an 
unproblematic public interest in conservation.55  Just as the federal ju-
diciary had recently played a crucial role in the battle over desegrega-
tion, so it now seemed possible that it would lead in the development 
of a substantive common law of national environmental priorities. 
Events played out differently.  In a series of decisions, the Justices 
went out of their way to indicate that reviewing courts were not to use 
NEPA’s substantive language as a basis for assessing agency decisions: 
the statute was purely procedural.56  Cannon suggests that this way of 
reading NEPA may have reflected the Justices’ own positions within 
the American division between the ecological and pre-ecological para-
digms (p. 272).  Making NEPA a purely procedural statute kept a 
place at the table for the values of the ecological outlook, but declined 
to give those values any special authority (pp. 265–67). 
NEPA, then, is a microcosm of where ecological values stand in 
law: enduringly part of the mix, but frequently shunted to the side.  
The partial revolution that brought the ecological outlook into Ameri-
can culture, politics, and law remains incomplete and contested.  The 
ecological revolution has inspired many acts of judicial creativity that 
stitch its new premises and concerns into the law’s old conceptual fab-
ric, notably Justice Stevens’s treatment of standing in Massachusetts v. 
EPA57 and Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the ecological “nexus” of 
federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction in Rapanos v. United States.58  
However, judicial interpretation has more often restricted the influence 
of the ecological revolution and left much of the legal system commit-
ted to autonomy, mastery, and the exploitation of the natural world, 
rather than developing a countervailing program of interdependence, 
cooperation, and caretaking. 
 
III.  A WAY BEYOND DIVISION? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 54 See id. at 743–45 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 55 See id. at 758–60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 56 See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (“The only role for a court is 
to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences; it cannot ‘inter-
ject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’” 
(quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972))).  
 57 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007). 
 58 547 U.S. 715, 782–87 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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A certain modesty is very basic to Cannon’s intellectual style.  His 
claims advance with careful qualifications on their flanks, and his con-
clusions are on balance rather than categorical.  This attitude serves 
him well in the bulk of the book, where his close readings of Supreme 
Court decisions in their cultural contexts benefit from a sure hand and 
careful eye.  It is invaluable to revisit these cases with a guide who 
combines the precision of a veteran lawyer with the sensitivity to trope 
and implication of a literary critic.  Nonetheless, one wants more.  
A.  Cannon’s “Environmentalist Futures” 
When Cannon comes to the concluding big-picture assessment that 
seems to be mandatory in books on law and politics, his careful style 
immunizes him from overreach, but also seems to inhibit him from 
saying all that he might have.  For more than a decade, a polemical 
contest has been afoot to account for environmentalism’s political stall.  
Some have argued that the movement has lost its fire and imagination 
by allowing itself to become ensconced in ordinary Beltway politics as 
just another interest group, rather than the prophetic cultural move-
ment it once was.59  Others claim that political environmentalism is a 
victim of its own success: pollution controls and other political victo-
ries have reduced the sense of crisis that fired calls for basic change.60  
Still others argue that environmentalism’s brief flush of political victo-
ry created an illusion of consensus, when in fact the “dominant social 
paradigm” of human autonomy and mastery over a bountiful world 
remained deep seated and powerful: its adherents struck back no later 
than the first Sagebrush Rebellion of antiregulation Westerners in the 
1970s, and were buoyed by their alliance with the Reaganite New 
Right and its Tea Party successors.61  Cannon is most convinced by the 
third interpretation, focused on deep-seated cultural conflict (pp. 7–10, 
13–19), and least by the first, which treats Beltway politics as cause  
rather than symptom of environmentalism’s post-prophetic period (pp. 
275–77); but, in his even-handed style, he allows some weight to each. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of 
the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 102 (2001) (“Environmentalism had matured 
from a social movement to an extensive network of interest group organizations with a presence 
in Washington, D.C., like that of any other political lobby.”); James Gustave Speth, The Case for a 
New American Environmentalism, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10066, 10067 (2009) (describing the current 
state of the environmental movement as “pragmatic and incrementalist”). 
 60 See Coglianese, supra note 59, at 113–14.  The arguments are not mutually exclusive, and 
Coglianese, like Cannon, finds room for both. 
 61 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 17, at 223–24.  This culturally focused story of 
populist mobilization should be augmented by attention to a key institutional development: the 
move of American business from a broad acceptance of regulation as legitimate and even advan-
tageous to an antiregulatory program advanced by, among others, lobbyists and think tanks.  I 
incorporate this shift into a history of environmental law in the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury in Purdy, Our Place in the World, supra note 17. 
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Cannon’s prescriptions are constructive and tentative.  He is inter-
ested mostly in the ways that new problems and solutions might shift 
the cultural politics of environmentalism, creating space for new politi-
cal coalitions (pp. 286–87).  He notes the rise of market-modeled regu-
latory schemes, most visibly carbon markets, and the role of private 
enterprise in environmental initiatives, from nonprofit certifying 
groups such as the Forest Stewardship Council to Wal-Mart, which 
has adopted a series of environment-friendly sourcing policies (pp. 
288–92).62  The “greening” of business culture and “marketizing” of 
environmental policy might combine to bridge the cultural gap be-
tween long-standing probusiness, pro-property attitudes and the newer 
emphasis on interdependence and ecological caretaking.  So might the 
rise of a new strain of what one could call promastery environmental-
ism, which embraces technology such as carbon capture and 
geoengineering and is enthusiastic about the human role in shaping the 
world (pp. 292–95).63  The claim of this school of thought is that hu-
man impact on the planet is so vast and irreversible that people must 
give up misgivings about their world-shaping power if they are to use 
it well (p. 293).  Promastery environmentalism has room for traditional 
images of human agency and the resilience of nature, but also embrac-
es the environmentalist idea that people must be conscious caretakers 
of an interdependent world (p. 293).  With characteristic balance,  
Cannon sees promise in the developments, but warns against abandon-
ing the more radical strains of the ecological outlook, especially its ro-
mantic responsiveness to the beauty and sublimity of the natural world 
and its commitment to the intrinsic value of nature (pp. 296–98).   
These attitudes may be hard to defend in a rulemaking hearing or a 
venture capital presentation, but they have been politically and cultur-
ally productive before, and there is no reason to assume they are ex-
hausted now. 
These careful claims are quite consistent with the book’s topic and 
method, as well as Cannon’s own style.  His main concern is to read 
Supreme Court opinions as special instances of a broader set of cultur-
al and political divisions, in order to understand how those divisions 
are contributing to the development of law.  Thus, at its core this is a 
diagnostic rather than prescriptive book.  That is not to say that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 129 (2013) (discussing the role of private organizations and for-profit businesses in envi-
ronmental policy innovation). 
 63 See, e.g., Peter Kareiva et al., Conservation in the Anthropocene: Beyond Solitude and Fra-
gility, THE BREAKTHROUGH (Winter 2012), http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past 
-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene [http://perma.cc/B8Q8-WQX2] (“Conservation 
should seek to support and inform the right kind of development — development by design, done 
with the importance of nature to thriving economies foremost in mind.”). 
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Cannon should stand up from his careful interpretive work and an-
nounce that he has found a key to the future of environmental politics.  
No key to any area of politics is likely to emerge directly from a close 
reading of Supreme Court opinions. 
Having said that, it would still have been interesting to see Cannon 
set his interpretive arguments within a broader historical and analytic 
frame.  There is more to say about both the long trajectory of envi-
ronmental politics and its contemporary prospects.  Cannon prepares 
us for these questions with a rich picture of judicial disagreement in 
our own moment, but his excellent book does not quite carry its read-
ers across the threshold. 
B.  Why Cultural Division Is So Interesting Today 
Cannon’s project responds to a specific constellation of forces in 
environmental lawmaking.  Political deadlock has prevented passage 
of significant new environmental legislation since the 1990 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act.  Environmental lawmaking for twenty-
five years has happened, not on the clean slate of legislative drafting, 
but on the ever-denser palimpsest where existing statutes are interpret-
ed.  The action has accordingly moved away from movements and leg-
islatures, which dominated the field during environmental law’s rise in 
the 1970s, in favor of agencies and courts.  The central role of agencies 
accounts for much of the prominence that cost-benefit analysis has 
gained in environmental law and scholarship: whereas legislators es-
tablish authoritative values, regulators implement and prioritize 
among values already established.  In doing so, they naturally seek the 
appearance of neutral and technical decisionmaking, to avoid creating 
the impression that they are acting (reluctantly or otherwise) as a sec-
ond phalanx of legislators, choosing values on behalf of the public.64 
The courts join the agencies as the major environmental lawmak-
ers of the age.  Whether the Clean Water Act allows for cost-benefit-
based interpretations of its technology standards, or whether the Clean 
Air Act extends to greenhouse gas emissions, are interpretive questions 
that dictate substantive policy on these environmental questions in  
the absence of new legislation.65  To state the obvious, the statutes do 
not explicitly resolve these questions, and so judges’ interpretations 
become central.  In this situation, there is much to learn from Can-
non’s sophisticated, culturally focused version of legal realism.  What 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 I develop this argument in more detail in Purdy, Our Place in the World, supra note 17, at 
877–83. 
 65 See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226–27 (2009) (finding some  
permission for cost-benefit consideration in agency implementation of the Clean Water Act’s  
technology-based standards); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (finding that the 
Clean Air Act’s definition of “pollutant” extends to greenhouse gas emissions).  
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determines a court’s decisions, if not the text of the statute?  Cannon 
makes a strong case that, often, the driver is the cultural valence of the  
environmental problem at issue: the judge’s image of the natural 
world, both moral and material, and the corresponding image of the 
human place in the world.  The reason that the New Environmental 
Paradigm and the Dominant Social Paradigm grapple for control in 
the United States Reports is not some diffuse zeitgeist: it is a matter of 
which institutions can get anything done today (courts and agencies), 
which institutions cannot (legislatures), and which tools and techniques 
available to the former institutions remain active (interpretation of 
statutes and the Constitution). 
This is why students of public law may have detected a similarity 
between Cannon’s style of argument and that of certain constitutional 
scholars who study the ways that popular ideas of liberty and equality 
interact with the text of the Constitution, giving new and  
ever-contested meaning to old terms that, to speak literally, hardly ever 
change.66  This is the pattern of cultural and legal struggle when  
ever-changing politics and concrete problems are governed by rules 
and principles embodied in static text.  Cannon’s scholarship, like that 
of his fellow culturalists and movement theorists in constitutional law, 
helps both scholars and practitioners to understand the complex ways 
in which law can serve as connective tissue between widely held val-
ues and beliefs, on the one hand, and the institutional operations of 
power, on the other.  Reading him, one recognizes oneself, or one’s op-
ponents — recognizes one’s own community of conflict — in the activ-
ity of law. 
C.  From Holocene Thought to Anthropocene Politics 
This, then, is the situation in which Cannon’s work finds its force 
and appeal.  It is also, however, a situation that has to change.  Both 
the New Environmental Paradigm and the Dominant Social Paradigm 
are products of what the future will think of as Holocene Culture.  
That is, they are products of an anomalous ten-thousand-year blink in 
the eye of geological time, in which relatively stable climate patterns 
made the planet extraordinarily congenial to human habitation: above 
all, consistent and temperate weather permitted agriculture to flourish 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007) (exploring the relationship between popular political 
movements and constitutional interpretation); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term — 
Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
191 (2008) (same); see also Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) 
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
  
2016] COMING INTO THE ANTHROPOCENE 1637 
long enough that farming societies produced urban, imperial, and 
technological civilization, eventually reaching the momentum that to-
day’s globally networked world continues to extend. 
The difficulty is that the vast industrial and fossil fuel economy 
that Holocene stability fostered has, in turn, undone the Holocene.  
Human pressure on the planet’s systems has ushered in what commen-
tators call the Anthropocene, the geological age of humanity.  The de-
fining feature of the Anthropocene — whose official status is under 
consideration at the time of writing by the Stratigraphy Commission of 
the Geological Society of London,67 which formally designates geologi-
cal eras — is that human activity has become a force, arguably the 
force, in the development of the planet.  The signal Anthropocene 
phenomenon is global climate change driven by changing atmospheric 
chemistry.  Mass extinction, disruptions in the nitrogen cycle, and 
global toxicity count toward the Anthropocene as well.68 
In what sense are Cannon’s ecological and pre-ecological para-
digms products of Holocene thought?  To understand this, it helps to 
appreciate two distinct bases for calling our time the beginning of the 
Age of Humanity.  The first and more straightforward is the 
Anthropocene Condition, the situation in which human action has 
changed every place, species, and system of the natural world, from 
the upper atmosphere to the deep sea.  The Anthropocene, in this 
sense, is the time in which there is no longer any such thing as “na-
ture” that is apart from and prior to human beings: all the world is a 
joint product of human activity and underlying nonhuman phenome-
na, blended in patterns from which the two can no longer be separat-
ed.  The second and less straightforward is the Anthropocene Insight, 
which recognizes that discussions about “nature” have always been less 
a description of the natural world than a means for humans to talk to 
and about other humans. 
1.  Anthropocene Disruptions. — The Anthropocene Condition 
undercuts key premises of both the Dominant Social Paradigm and the 
New Environmental Paradigm.  The pre-ecological vision of the world 
as a stable and resilient storehouse of resources for human use is a 
cosmological narration of Holocene life.  It generalizes from a very 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 See Working Group on the “Anthropocene,” SUBCOMMISSION ON QUATERNARY  
STRATIGRAPHY, http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene [http://perma.cc 
/GS4A-WXZM].  
 68 See, e.g., Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Climate of History: Four Theses, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 
197 (2009) (arguing for the relevance of the Anthropocene for social theory and historiography); 
Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship, 40 AMBIO 
739 (2011) (setting out extent of human impact on the planet); cf. Jedediah Purdy, Anthropocene  
Fever, AEON MAG. (Mar. 31, 2015), https://aeon.co/essays/should-we-be-suspicious-of-the 
-anthropocene-idea [http://perma.cc/V2DT-Q4U9] (exploring the cultural sources and multiple 
meanings of the Anthropocene). 
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particular historical experience, of a world not catastrophically 
perturbed by either natural or human phenomena, and so able to serve 
as a reliable substrate of human projects.  It may once have been true 
that the world was, for many purposes, stable and bountiful; but in an 
age of massive human-induced change, which is already disrupting 
human life with droughts and superstorms, the premise of benign 
stability cannot hold. 
The new ecological worldview, by contrast, insists that the world is 
fragile, endangered, and interdependent.  Thus far, it seems promising 
as a framework for the Anthropocene.  But there is a problem.  Mod-
ern environmentalism has relied at a very basic level on the idea of na-
ture: a picture of the world as it was, or would be, absent human in-
tervention.  Such an idea is the basis of two features of the ecological 
outlook that Cannon aptly identifies: the intrinsic value of natural 
things (p. 14), and the principle that humans should live in harmony 
with the natural world (p. 19).  Without a nature that is independent 
of human beings, what is it, exactly, that has intrinsic value?  What is 
the natural order with which humans should seek harmony?  These 
basic commitments of the ecological outlook require a baseline idea of 
nature, of what the natural world is apart from human action.  If hu-
man action is part of what creates the world, how can the character of 
the world guide human action? 
The second paradigm-arresting aspect of the Anthropocene is the 
Anthropocene Insight.  This is the recognition that talk of “nature” has 
always been, in fact, a way for people to talk to and about other hu-
man beings.  Thus nature has been invoked to support both economic 
development and environmental preservation, liberty and slavery, de-
mocracy and monarchy, the hierarchy of the sexes and their equality, 
and so forth.69  In light of this insight, it simply is not credible to imag-
ine the natural world as supporting any particular human agenda, 
whether development and extraction or preservation and aesthetic ap-
preciation.  The world does not impart moral status to human proj-
ects.  In order to imagine a world that could do so, one must already 
be in the grip of a human interpretation of the natural world that 
braids its phenomena with judgments and projects that can come  only 
from people.70 
It might seem that the Anthropocene Insight would be especially 
damaging to the ecological paradigm, with its openly moralized view 
of harmonious nature; however, the pre-ecological, anthropocentric 
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 69 I present this argument in detail in JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR 
THE ANTHROPOCENE 11–17, 31–45 (2015). 
 70 The canonical statement of this argument comes in JOHN STUART MILL, Nature, in 
THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 3, 62–64 (1874) (arguing that nature can have no moral signifi-
cance other than what people impart to it). 
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view of the natural world is also deeply moralized, only in ways that 
are less evident because they are camouflaged as common sense.  The 
development-oriented idea that nature is the supportive substrate of 
market capitalism arose in integral connection with the American civic 
religions of natural rights and Manifest Destiny.71  A natural world 
portrayed as calling out for labor, clearing, and settlement supported 
the egalitarian individualism (among white men) of the early American 
republic and the bloody clearing of Native Americans, who allegedly 
failed to fulfill their natural duty to make the continent productive.72  
The history of talk about the natural world is thoroughly a history of 
its moralization.  Environmentalism is only the latest example — one 
that strikes the contemporary ear as having special moral concern for 
“nature.” 
Combined, the Anthropocene Condition and Anthropocene Insight 
imply a world that is the joint product of human activity and nonhu-
man processes, and in which human activity inevitably reflects human 
judgments and priorities.  There is no “pattern of nature” that can tell 
us, for instance, how to organize an economy or direct research into 
new technologies. 
2.  Law’s Special Role in the Anthropocene. — Law plays a special 
role in the joint human-natural production of the Anthropocene world.  
Human activity is a kind of collective landscape architecture: by the 
ways we get food and shelter and propel ourselves from place to place, 
we quite literally shape the planet, from its soils and terrain to its 
atmospheric and oceanic chemistry.  The legal framework guides and 
shapes this world-forming activity in many ways, including through 
energy policy, agricultural policy, transport systems, zoning, pollution 
laws, wilderness and parks preservation, and so forth.  Laws, in turn, 
express the worldviews of those who make them, reflecting their 
priorities, dislikes, and points of indifference.73  So nineteenth-century 
American law helped to produce an army of citizens who cleared, 
settled, and developed the continent across a moving frontier, leaving 
in their wake the checkerboard pattern of roads and fields still visible 
from airplanes over the Midwest.  So the zoning laws of the twentieth 
century, combined with fuel policy and highway construction, 
produced the landscape of suburbs, exurbs, and commercial and 
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 71 See PURDY, supra note 69, at 70–95 (exploring this episode and its persistent influence in 
American environmental politics and imagination). 
 72 See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 533–45 (13th ed. 1884); 
JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137–76 
(1993) (describing the reception and use of natural-law theory with respect to Native American 
land claims). 
 73 See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 9–10 (1956) (arguing that the design of federal set-
tlement policy channeled human energy in the interest of development). 
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industrial zones where most Americans live today.74  So our legally 
structured energy economy is producing the global atmosphere of the 
twenty-first century, and thus the climate in which everyone does and 
will live. 
The Anthropocene is not mainly a theoretical conceit, but rather a 
theoretical distillation of concrete circumstances.  These circumstances 
show up in very specific ways.  There is no “natural” baseline for cli-
mate change goals, no principled way of distinguishing between “natu-
ral” and “anthropogenic” climate change — which was part of the mo-
tive for Chief Justice Roberts’s argument in Massachusetts v. EPA that 
climate change is incompatible with traditional legal ideas of causation 
and redress.75  Species conservation efforts inevitably involve some 
level of choice between those things that are to be saved and those that 
will be allowed to perish, choices that draw on and impose human pri-
orities among other living things.76  Land conservancies deal almost 
invariably with disrupted and transformed landscapes, leading to 
questions about what it is they wish to “conserve,” and why.77  Even 
wilderness is a federally defined legal category requiring a series of 
land-use decisions that turn on judgments about what are, and what 
are not, wilderness values.78 
IV.  POLITICS AS THE ANTHROPOCENE PIVOT 
For the moment, adopting the Anthropocene mantle has affinities 
with a specific kind of agenda: one centered on human interests and 
unapologetic about actively shaping and changing the natural setting.  
This is the mastery-oriented environmentalism described earlier in this 
Review.  As Peter Kareiva, lead scientist of the Nature Conservancy, 
has put it: 
 
 If there is no wilderness, if nature is resilient rather than frag-
ile . . . what should be the new vision for conservation? . . . Conservation 
should seek to support . . . development by design, done with the im-
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 74 See, e.g., Michael P. Conzen, Developing Large-Scale Consumer Landscapes, in THE MAK-
ING OF THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE 423, 423–50 (Michael P. Conzen ed., 2d ed. 2010); John A. 
Jakle, Paving America for the Automobile, in THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE, 
supra, at 403, 403–22. 
 75 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 540–42 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 76 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to 
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (setting out new challenges that confront spe-
cies conservation in a world disrupted by climate change). 
 77 See Kareiva et al., supra note 63 (exploring the implications of the Anthropocene for land 
conservation). 
 78 See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc) (holding that a fish-stocking program is a commercial activity within the terms of the 
Wilderness Act and thus forbidden within a federal wilderness area). 
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portance of nature to thriving economies foremost in mind. . . . Instead of 
pursuing the protection of biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, a new con-
servation should seek to enhance those natural systems that benefit the 
widest number of people . . . . Nature could be a garden . . . .79 
The appearance of affinity between Anthropocene rhetoric and 
Kareiva’s human-centered agenda is partly a matter of who has seized 
the label, and partly a result of the pre-Anthropocene language that 
still characterizes much of environmentalist politics.  Because many 
environmentalists use a Holocene vocabulary that is easily made to 
seem philosophically naïve, their critics can score points by observing, 
for instance, that all ecosystems have been disrupted and that all con-
servation choices involve values. 
That said, the idea that embracing the Anthropocene implies sup-
porting a human-centered, managerial program mistakes a contingent 
affinity for an essential connection.  The pivot of the mistake is a con-
fusion between two senses in which the values that guide environmen-
tal decisions may be “human.”  In one sense, human values are those 
that people can understand, hold, and respond to — that is, they must 
be possible bases for evaluation and action.  In the second sense, hu-
man values are restricted to some set of human interests, whether as 
narrow as economic growth or as broad as, say, aesthetic appreciation 
of nature.80  The managerial values that certain Anthropocene enthu-
siasts tout are human in both senses; but it is only in the first sense 
that Anthropocene values must be human values.  That is, people can 
take them seriously and act on them.  But values that are human in 
this sense may include many that are not human-centered in the more 
substantive sense: they may include, for instance, the claims that na-
ture matters for its own sake, that we should strive to establish and 
support certain kinds of harmony in natural systems, and so forth.  To 
advance these nonanthropocentric values in a manner consistent with 
the Anthropocene Insight, it is simply necessary to understand that 
they are human values, not imposed on us by a moral logic inherent in  
 
the natural world, and that they need to be vindicated among human 
beings, not dictated on the basis of their “naturalness.” 
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 79 Kareiva et al., supra note 63; see also Peter Kareiva et al., Domesticated Nature: Shaping 
Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human Welfare, 316 SCIENCE 1866, 1866–69 (2007) (advancing 
similar arguments); Peter Kareiva & Michelle Marvier, Conservation for the People, SCI. AM., 
Oct. 2007, at 50, 50–57 (same); cf. D.T. Max, Green Is Good, NEW YORKER, May 12, 2014, at 54, 
59–61 (describing Kareiva’s role in the ongoing controversy over his managerial and human-
oriented agenda). 
 80 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Must a Concern for the Environment Be Centred on Human 
Beings?, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY 233, 234 (1995) (drawing the contrast between val-
ues centered on human interests and values available for human belief). 
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A.  Markets, Technocracy, or Democracy? 
The real question is how the relevant human values will be deter-
mined and implemented: which decision procedure will guide collec-
tive judgments about what sort of world to shape?  In effect, there are 
only a few alternatives.  First, the decision can be marketized, that is, 
coordinated by the price mechanism, which links billions of spending, 
investment, and production choices in a single pattern of resource  
allocation.81  In a second alternative, the decision can be made 
technocratically, by specifying a form of expert technique to generate 
an ostensibly neutral best result.82  Or, in the third alternative, the de-
cision can be made democratically, through public contest over the 
meaning of the natural world and the human place in it.83 
Markets and technocracy have their respective advantages, but 
they are also profoundly unsuited to the task of deciding how to shape 
a world.  Democracy is the only decision procedure adequate to the 
problem but, inconveniently, is also the most difficult to achieve.  Let 
us take the three in order. 
1.  The Limits of Markets. — Markets are highly efficient in 
aggregating and transmitting the local knowledge contained in 
decentralized economic decisions.  For instance, a judgment about 
whether to install copper or ceramic tile in a kitchen in San Francisco 
incorporates everything from the intensification of demand caused by 
the advent of new energy technologies using the metal to the risk to 
supply caused by the threat of political instability in copper-mining 
regions — all through the supple instrument of price, so that the 
purchaser need not know any of the qualitative detail.  Markets also 
have notorious limitations: they do not take account of unpriced 
externalities (a problem at the base of much of environmental 
economics), and they process only the priorities of those who have 
spending power, meaning that they reflect rather than resist structural 
inequalities in wealth — for instance, in producing research into 
baldness rather than into the diseases of global poverty.84  But the 
most basic limitation of markets for the Anthropocene question — the 
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 81 See, e.g., PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM (1999) (arguing for a merger of 
free-market and ecological thinking); James Salzman, Review Essay, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997) (setting out the development and prospects of ecosystem services, a 
key concept in unifying ecological management and market valuations). 
 82 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993) (arguing for a 
cost-benefit-oriented approach to environmental management); PURDY, supra note 69, at 153–87 
(exploring historical origins and political affinities of the managerial approach). 
 83 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 66; Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate 
Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010) (describing central role 
of democratic initiative and conflict in environmental lawmaking). 
 84 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175 (2003) 
(setting out and applying key features of economics and its uses in environmental policy). 
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question of what sort of world to create — is that markets operate only 
within the legal systems that establish their frameworks: for instance, 
laws dictate what may be owned, what one may do with it, who owns 
what at the outset, how redistribution is managed, which sorts of 
public goods are provided and how, and so forth.85  In a basic sense, 
markets are derivative of law, and therefore derivative of the political 
decisions that generate and enforce law. 
This point is common to legal realists and sophisticated main-
stream economists alike.  It need not weigh against entrusting any par-
ticular area of economic life to market coordination.  It does, however, 
mean that the world a market will make is a function of the prior 
choices that constitute that market — to give a signal and simple ex-
ample, whether carbon emissions have a price, and how it is deter-
mined.  Answers to the Anthropocene question come from political 
and legal choices that give a market its shape, not the decisions that 
take place within the market.  Changes within a given market, rather 
than changes to the economic order itself, will always make their dif-
ference only on the margin.  For instance, personal or corporate deci-
sions to purchase voluntary carbon credits will produce some supply of 
those (as long as they are legally recognized), but not at the systemic 
scale of an economy-wide price for carbon.  Similarly, a trend toward 
buying sustainably produced food will raise prices and production lev-
els, but in a way that differentiates the market into sustainable and 
nonsustainable segments (the latter increasingly attractive to those 
who must, or happen to, prize affordability) rather than pivot the sys-
tem as a whole. 
World-making choices, then, must take place at the scale of system 
design, not merely within an existing price system.  To speak of en-
trusting environmental decisions to a “complete” market, one that pric-
es all environmental effects of every action, is itself an incomplete an-
swer.  The internal workings of a market cannot provide that market 
its own prices, except in a way that is derivative of the foundational 
legal and political choices that constitute that market in the first place.  
A market is an instrument of world-making policy, not its source. 
2.  The Limits of Technocracy. — Technocratic decisions have a 
parallel limitation.  On the one hand, they benefit (at least notionally) 
from associations with expertise and neutrality: ideally, they purify key 
public decisions of the distortions that notoriously accompany politics, 
such as factional selfishness, emotional projection and other forms of 
irrationality, and the shifting and provisional character of nominal 
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 85 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Moral Standing of the Market, in ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1 
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985). 
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majorities.86  On the other hand, if technocratic decisions are to be 
perceived as legitimate, they must implement values that have already 
been established as authoritative.  (Otherwise, technocracy would be 
merely authoritarian.)  If these values do not come from previously 
enacted laws, then they typically come from efforts to measure the 
interests and preferences of present and (at a discount) future 
individuals.87  When technocracy takes its values from previous 
legislation or other political acts, it derives its legitimacy from the 
sovereign polity; when it takes its values from measurements of 
interests and preferences, it acts as a sort of ideal market. 
The latter kinds of measurements depend on various judgments 
that cannot be justified on internal, technocratic grounds.  These in-
clude decisions about the technical aspects of measurement such as 
(but by no means exclusive to) the discount rate for the interest of fu-
ture generations.  They also depend, for their raw data, on the existing 
interests and preferences that people have.88  These judgments, inter-
ests, and preferences, in turn, are products of the present: people wish 
for the kinds of things they know to desire (who now longs for a sight 
of the extinct North American ground sloth?), and the measurement of 
their interests and preferences reflects a current technical consensus 
that can command a modicum of political legitimacy.89  In other 
words, technocratic decisions are ideally suited to the rationalization of 
the world as it is, and the refined expression of priorities as they are 
now understood; but they are no way to choose a world. 
Like the market, then, technocratic environmental governance is an 
incomplete response to the Anthropocene question.  Its judgments are 
derivative of politically established values; of markets, actual or ideal-
ized, that depend in turn on politics for their definition and creation; 
and of personal values and interests that arise from and reflect the 
world as it has so far been created by human activity.  Like markets, 
technocracy takes its bearings from politics, whether that politics is 
explicit in legislation or embedded in politically created market prac-
tices, landscapes, and ecosystems. 
3.  The Case for Democracy. — The alternative is to embrace a 
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 86 See generally, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1927) (arguing that ex-
isting majoritarian schemes of popular voting are not adequate versions of any credible concep-
tion of collective self-governance). 
 87 See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION 1–56 (2012) 
(proposing a sophisticated form of consequentialism for the assessment of public policy). 
 88 See DOUGLAS M. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 99–119, 150–75 (2010) (argu-
ing for the importance of procedures that make possible continued creative engagement with val-
ues, rather than simple replication of those values now in force). 
 89 See DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME 115–38 (2014) (setting out the value 
commitments unavoidably embedded in any effort to apply cost-benefit analysis to complex envi-
ronmental problems). 
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fully political view of the natural world.  To summarize the argument: 
(1) In the Anthropocene, the world we inhabit is the world we make.  
(2) We make the world, in turn, by the ways that we inhabit it.  (3) We 
shape these ways, at the scale of economies and legal systems, through 
collective choices, via politics and law, that provide the architecture of 
everyday life.  (4) If these choices are to extend beyond the simple 
reproduction of what already is and instead allow us to select the 
world in which we want to live, they must be political.  (5) If political 
choices are to be legitimate, they must be democratic. 
The meaning that I am giving to democracy here is deliberately 
underspecified.  The preceding arguments in this Part establish that 
answers to the Anthropocene question — the question of what kind of 
world to shape — cannot be satisfactorily generated through techno-
cratic technique or market coordination.  They must come from else-
where.  If we do not defer to religious or other transcendental claims 
(such as the metaphysical value theory of “deep ecology”), then we 
must look to politics to select the values that will shape the 
Anthropocene.  I defy anyone to bring forward an account of  
legitimate political answers to the Anthropocene question that is not 
democratic. 
More specifically, democracy has several roles to play.  A demo-
cratic politics of nature produces authoritative answers to collective 
questions: in this sense it has a sovereign role, the role of pivotal 
decisionmaking.  But democracy also organically connects the agendas 
of collective decision with cultural experiments and innovations that 
create new ways of valuing the natural world, new ways of living with 
it, which can in turn influence the next wave of lawmaking.  In this 
sense, democracy plays a discursive role, linking cultural, aesthetic, 
and practical essays in living with the sovereign role of shaping shared 
rules and institutions.  A recent example of on-the-ground changes that 
might contribute to large-scale lawmaking is the surge of interest in 
the sources, quality, and environmental effects of food.90  Another is 
the rise of local, regional, national, and international movement efforts 
to live in a low-carbon way.91  Still another is the movement to spread 
decentralized, renewable energy sources, particularly solar power, in 
ways that complement, work around, and aim to overgrow the existing 
energy grid.  Each of these involves new ways of seeing the relationship 
between human activity and the natural world: food systems and en-
ergy sources come into focus, become visible, for members of these 
movements.  Each generates new kinds of satisfaction: the pleasure of 
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 90 See, e.g., Purdy, Our Place in the World, supra note 17, at 905–12 (discussing the potential of 
the food movement to contribute to development in environmental ethics and politics). 
 91 See id. at 917–27 (discussing how low-carbon movements can impact popular politics of 
climate change). 
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working and eating in an intelligible and sustainable food web, gener-
ating the energy one uses, or getting through the day emitting a mini-
mum amount of carbon dioxide.  These ways of living, in turn, may 
become the basis of politics aimed at law reform: alternative versions 
of the Farm Bill, support for a new kind of electric grid, and so forth. 
Although these examples are current, the pattern they describe has 
been around for a very long time.  The modern system of national 
parks and wilderness, for example, owes much to cultural minorities of 
trekkers and sporting enthusiasts such as the early Sierra Club and the 
Boone and Crockett Club, which cultivated romantic satisfaction in 
nature.92  These earlier movements turned their own modes of engag-
ing nature from eccentric pleasures into national priorities, a part of 
the larger culture and, soon enough, lawmaking. 
B.  Caveat: Politics in a Time of Political Failure 
This case for democracy is optimistic about the key role that the 
democratic process could play in choosing future worlds.  It must be 
said that there is also plenty of cause for pessimism.  Few today would 
turn to democratic politics to solve contentious and contested social 
problems.  Democracy has been in crisis (or, perhaps more accurately, 
crises).  In the United States, elections are awash in money,93 and re-
cent governments have produced gridlock, unpopular — and arguably 
fruitless — wars, and, tellingly, no meaningful legislation on climate 
change, the signal environmental problem of the day.  In Europe, es-
tablished parties are collapsing electorally, while the major joint proj-
ect of the region’s democracies, the European Union, is experiencing a 
crisis of legitimacy.94  In the former Soviet bloc, a transition to nominal 
democracy, once welcomed in a sanguine mood, now looks like the  
watershed of a new kind of (more or less) soft authoritarianism.95  
Even democracy’s place as the only acceptable standard of political le-
gitimacy is in doubt: China’s nondemocratic regime and its supporters 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See PURDY, supra note 69, at 180–86 (on the Boone and Crockett Club); Purdy, supra note 
83, at 1147–49 (on the Sierra Club).  
 93 The Center for Responsive Politics estimates the cost of national elections in 2012 at over $6 
billion, the most expensive ever.  See The Money Behind the Elections, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture [http://perma.cc/5ZB6-4KUV]. 
 94 See Tony Barber, Europe Must Confront Crisis of Legitimacy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012, 
5:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4e2c793c-8d50-11e1-8b49-00144feab49a.html (warning of a 
“potentially far-reaching crisis of legitimacy in Europe’s political system”); Steven Erlanger, As 
Europe’s Political Landscape Shifts, Two-Party System Fades, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015),  
h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 5 / 0 4 / 0 8 / w o r l d / e u r o p e / a s - e u r o p e a n - v o t i n g - f r a g m e n t s - d a y s - o f - s i n g l e 
-party-rule-fade.html (“The fragmentation of traditional party voting is increasing all over  
Europe. . . . The days of a ‘broad church’ party and governments formed by a single party are 
fading.”).  
 95 See Perry Anderson, Russia’s Managed Democracy, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 25, 2007, 
at 3, 3–12 (summarizing scholarship on Russia’s post-Soviet governance).  
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show a new boldness in criticizing Western democracy as a weak, inef-
fective system.96 
Even if some of these problems turn out to be no more than the 
passing crises of the day, there are more basic structural challenges.  So 
far as democracy can be said to have succeeded, it has succeeded on 
the scale of nations and their subjurisdictions, such as states and 
towns.  It has also, perhaps less obviously, had its own temporal scale: 
it is a political system run by and chiefly for the living.  But, notori-
ously, climate change and other environmental crises outrun those 
scales; they are global and very long term.97  They also outrun familiar 
habits of moral and prudential judgment: their lines of cause and ef-
fect, responsibility and prevention, are obscure relative to the more 
palpable and immediate tasks that have formed commonsense notions 
of what it is to do or prevent harm, or even to act at all.98  The very 
problems that increase the need for democratic engagement also make 
it less likely to succeed, at least as it now is. 
Nor is this true only of environmental problems.  The global econ-
omy of financial capitalism turns out, like global environmental prob-
lems, to outstrip political management in both scale and complexity.  
For this reason, Professor Thomas Piketty’s 2014 bestseller, Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, was at once an empirically rigorous exposé 
of markets’ propensity to amplify inequality and an inadvertent medi-
tation on the powerlessness of national political communities to do  
anything about it.99  The comparison is not casual: it goes to the heart 
of the problem.  In the Anthropocene, there is no separating economic 
and ecological futures.  The economy is the architecture of the human 
activity that shapes the planet, and both now work at the global scale. 
Politics, in turn, is the only way to make binding collective deci-
sions about our shaping role.  Politics is both what we need to do and 
what we cannot do, at least for now.  The central role that judicial in-
terpretation, and hence judicial worldview, plays in our environmental 
politics today is, in some measure, a symptom of this pervasive failure 
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 96 See, e.g., Eric X. Li, Opinion, Why China’s Political Model Is Superior, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/opinion/why-chinas-political-model-is-superior.html 
(arguing that American democracy is an unsustainable form of government). 
 97 See, e.g., JAMIESON, supra note 89, at 100 (arguing for the possibility that democracy’s ori-
entation to the present makes it unable to address climate change effectively); Stephen M.  
Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of 
Moral Corruption, 15 ENVTL. VALUES 397, 399–407 (2006) (setting out these arguments). 
 98 See, e.g., Jon Gertner, Why Isn’t the Brain Green?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/magazine/19Science-t.html (surveying psychological bases of 
failures to process climate harm as ethical harm). 
 99 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1–35 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (summarizing findings on accel-
erating inequality); see also PURDY, supra note 69, at 17–21 (arguing in greater detail for the 
linked character of economic and ecological crises). 
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of politics. 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion of the Anthropocene is not intended as unfriendly 
criticism of Cannon.  On the contrary, his interpretation of the last for-
ty years of Supreme Court opinions takes precisely the attitude that 
the Anthropocene demands.  The central upshot of an Anthropocene 
approach is that the work of environmental law — shaping a future 
world — must be recognized as thoroughly political.  In fact, the prob-
lem of nature itself must be recognized as political through and 
through.  Competing conceptions of the natural world and the human 
place in it are not alternatives to this politics (although partisans may 
present them as such).  They are aspects of it.  They are its characteris-
tic form. 
Environmental statutes crystallize these political conceptions of na-
ture.  As Cannon emphasizes, the antipollution and biodiversity stat-
utes of the 1970s reflected the ecological premises of nature’s fragility, 
interdependence, and inherent value, and the importance of seeking a 
harmonious human relation to it.  This, however, is just one example.  
The statutes that guided settlers across the American frontier reflected 
just as directly the nineteenth-century ideas that became Cannon’s 
“dominant social paradigm”: an image of the natural world as de-
manding and rewarding development, ideally in the form of individual 
and family ownership and agricultural settlement.100  The Wilderness 
Act101 reflects a Romantic conception of the natural world refined over 
decades of advocacy and eventually enshrined in the Act’s definitions, 
preamble, and operative language.102  The organic acts of the National 
Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service reflect the managerial, utili-
tarian, and statist conception of the natural world that informed much 
of Theodore Roosevelt–era Progressive reform and led Roosevelt to de-
scribe conservation as a model for all his domestic policies.103 
Judicial interpretation of all these statutes involves judgments 
about the human relation to the natural world.  As Cannon demon-
strates, this interpretation recapitulates the diverse and conflicting  
ideas that inform the statutes.  Environmental law is thus a layered 
and braided system of conflicting ideas of the world and how to inhab-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 17, at 185–88 (setting out the nineteenth-century 
providential republican program’s main features and ideological origins). 
 101 Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 
(2012)). 
 102 See id.; Purdy, American Natures, supra note 17, at 205–07 (setting out the Romantic ap-
proach’s features and origins). 
 103 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 17, at 189–99 (setting out the Progressive  
approach). 
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it it, some of which become authoritative for certain times and purpos-
es.  It is also a continuing contest over the image in which the world 
will be shaped.  Understanding environmental law in this light invites 
the adoption and extension of Cannon’s method.  His method could be 
extended to embrace all the worldviews that have shaped environmen-
tal law, and could help make explicit the lurking fact that the political 
shaping of the future world is at stake. 
In all of this there is the beginning of a strategy for imagining envi-
ronmental futures.  It is in fact the method that is implicit in Cannon’s 
concluding meditation.  This method is less a political program than a 
turn of mind, a way of focusing attention and energy.  It is, first, skep-
tical toward any claim to have identified or created a master vocabu-
lary for environmental politics, whether that is a philosophical account 
of the inherent value of living things or a new technique of cost-benefit 
analysis.  Such vocabularies should always be understood as products 
of, and moves within, a field of contested environmental visions whose 
conflicts these vocabularies cannot magically resolve.  Second, this at-
titude is keenly interested in the ways that concrete experiments in 
thinking and living — from the wilderness movement to the food 
movement to the rise of sustainable-energy activism — may adjust the 
relations among existing constituencies and their ideas, or even intro-
duce entirely new ones, thus shifting the field of political possibility. 
A way of thinking that built on Cannon’s analysis toward an 
Anthropocene politics would add two additional points.  A politically 
productive attitude should always include a keen awareness that a 
choice of environmental futures is inseparable from a choice of eco-
nomic futures: because economic life is at the center of humans’ collec-
tive shaping of the planet, there is no question of economic policy that 
is not also an environmental question, and no environmental question 
that can be resolved without corresponding economic judgments.  Fi-
nally, this attitude should also include an acute awareness of the gap 
between the ideal of democratic decisionmaking about these linked 
environmental-economic questions and the reality of democracy: inef-
ficacy, inadequate scope, the oligarchy-making role of money, and per-
sistent failures of collective self-restraint.  For the reasons developed 
above, an environmental politics adequate to the Anthropocene ques-
tion can arise only alongside an enhanced and expanded democracy. 
Cannon’s method also provides a solution to the cultural problem 
of environmental law that opened this review: that it is boring and  
alienating, despite its high stakes, especially to those who are drawn to 
its underlying subject matter.  The remedy is to excavate and trace out 
the many threads that tie the language of the statutes, their judicial 
and agency interpretation, and their constitutional housing and con-
straint, to vital and keenly felt ideas of the world and the human place 
in it.  It is to bring environmental law alive simply by showing that it 
is already alive: deeply imbued with moral and aesthetic conceptions 
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of the living world that are also human, political choices that courts, 
legislatures, agencies, and social movements will continue making into 
the future. 
Recovering environmental law from a certain technocratic narrow-
ness required an extraordinary suite of talents: a lawyer’s eye and a 
poet’s ear, a mature judgment about the meaning of decisions married 
to a youthful enthusiasm for the ideals that pulse behind the technical 
dispositions.  It took a rare mind to write this book.  Everyone who 
cares about environmental law should be grateful to Jonathan Cannon 
for doing it. 
